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A ABSTRACT 
After British rule ended in 1978, Solomon Islands became a nation. With Her 
Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State, Solomon Islands adopted the Westminster 
Parliamentary system. The people gave themselves a Constitution as their supreme law. How 
citizens related with one another and the State was within the rule of law. Under the new 
nation everyone was excited that they now ran their own country. There was trust and 
confidence that the peoples government was going to live up to the expectations agreed and 
pledge in the preamble of the Constitution. Expressed in the Constitution was hope to 
' uphold the principles of equality, social justice and equitable distribution of incomes' to 
benefit all people from different cultural traditions and islands. Sadly, for two decades, 
successive governments did not live up to these expectations. 
Inadequate government policies, squandering of resources through unsustainable 
development, disrespect for people's identity and the growing inequality in social and 
economic benefits irritated many. The Guadalcanal people were the first to demand the to 
State to address these issues, especially their felt grievances. After successive government 
inactivity to respond positively, Guadalcanal people revolted aggressively in 1998. This 
escalated into a conflict between Guadalcanl people and Malaitans based on Guadalcanal. 
Two militant groups, the Malaitan Eagle Force and the lsatabu Freedom Movement 
supported them. 
Jn October 2000 a peace agreement was signed, which brought an end to the 
hostility. However, today an environment of insecurity exists with little progress towards 
stability and normalcy. Therefore, there has to be a process of reconciliation through the 
development of restorative justice and respect of identities. There is a way forward . A 
government of national unity needs to be established in order to address basic issues that are 
at stake. A way forward for resolving the conflict in Solomon Islands in order for people 
move from conflict to joy, peace, progress and prosperity. 
(Word count: 14, 654) 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In 1893 an archipelago of pacific islands of mainly Melanesian people 
found itself under a European administration and named the British Solomon 
Islands Protectorate. To the north-west was German Melanesia (New Guinea) 
and to the south-east French and British New Hebrides (Vanuatu). Through 
the treaty of Berlin 1885, Britain had gained a place in the Melanesian sun. 
The British Resident Commissioner, Charles Woodford at Tulaghi, developed 
new laws and strategies to create comity and sustain this emerging community 
under British rule. 
In 1978, the granting of Independence by Britain gave international 
status for the newly created nation of Solomon Islands. Britain gave Solomon 
Islands a $35 million dollar gift 1 as the Union Jack was lowered. The handing 
over of responsibility was peaceful and in a dignified manner. Not a shot was 
fired; nor a funeral note. There was no ethnic strife amongst the peoples of 
these islands. People had dreams for a better life because administration of 
Solomon Islands was now in their hands. 
These islands deserved the description given by journalists and the 
media as the 'Happy Isles' . There was little crime. The police force was 
unarmed and there was minimal need for defence. People of different islands 
trusted one another and communicated peacefully through a developing 
'pidgin ' language. The national radio and a common Christian faith seemed 
to unite a people of diverse cultures and subsistence living. Though there was 
high mortality rate and low life expectancy, destitution was unknown. People 
were in control of their lives. 
1 John Roughan "Solomon Islands: The Quick Easy Fix" (24111 May 2001) 
<http: //www.scoop.co.nz/manson/stories/ 
HL0205/SOO 132.htm> (Last accessed 24111 September 2002). 
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There was hope that all would benefit from the creation of a self-
governing Solomon Islands. There would be equal opportunity for all and that 
everyone would live in unity and harmony; that diversity would be a strength. 
It was expected that elected parliamentarians would live by the national motto 
"To lead is to serve'. Sadly, the ship of dreams for the future of these islands 
has struck a coral reef and is grounded until rescued. 
Those who took the controls in this nation of islands seemed to have 
geared it to their own welfare at the expense of rural dwellers. Instead of their 
leadership as being a service to others, it appeared to be a service to self. The 
new capital, carved as an enclave on Guadalcanal, grew as a hub for the 
nation. All routes led to Honiara. The rural dweller on the Weather Coast, 
upon crossing the mountains of Guadalcanal and who looks down on 
Honiara, gazes upon a foreign sight. The third world meets the first. This 
contrast between those living in rural Guadalcanal and Honiara itself is huge. 
Most of the focus of the new nation was directed towards the national capital 
while other areas remained noticeably less developed. 
Migrating Malaitans and people from other islands made every effort 
to use the available opportunities in and around Honiara while the 
Guadalcanal people sat back and watched. There were growing disparities in 
the benefits provided by the State, particularly in availability of schooling and 
health facilities. The Guadalcanal people felt under-served and overshadowed 
on their own island. Constant protest against the central government for its 
inaction on their behalf was fruitless, sparking aggressive resentment. This 
was the spark that has caused the serious economic, social and political 
problems escalating into conflict. 
This paper seeks to explore the dynamics of the conflict in Solomon 
Islands in order to arrive at a way forward to its conclusion. The paper is 
divided up into eight parts: (I) Introduction; (II) Background of conflict; (III) 
Evolution of conflict; (IV) Sources of conflict; (V) Conflict to crisis; (VI) 
Quest for conflict solutions; (VII) A way forward; and (VII) Conclusion. 
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II BACKGROUND OF CONFLICT 
The conflict in the Solomon Islands started in the second half of 1998 
when violence erupted on the outskirts of Honiara. The conflict was between 
disgruntled people of Guadalcanal and displaced people from Malaita. 
Disgruntled Guadalcanal people who began the violence formed Isatabu 
Freedom Movement. The Guadalcanal militant group revolted against the 
State with home made rifles and World War II weapons. During this time the 
government did not anticipate escalation in conflict and did not regard actions 
of the Guadalcanal militants as serious. 
The attacks against the Royal Solomon Islands Police gradually 
extended to Malaitans who were living on the outskirts of Guadalcanal. The 
intention was to drive every Malaitan off Guadalcanal because of their 
dominant nature in terms of trade, business activities, settlement, education 
and other services. In some instance, such dominance influenced less respect 
against the custom of Guadalcanal people. A fine example is the increase of 
squatter settlements and farming on Guadalcanal customary lands. Most of 
the migrants from Malaita for decades used Guadalcanal land without paying 
any rentals or compensation. This was considered a threat to the use of 
resources on Guadalcanal, particularly when immigrants settled and had no 
respect for resource owners. 
In 1999 there were attacks carried out against Malaitans that resulted 
in several dozen people becoming victimised. During this time there was a 
tremendous intensity in the build up of arms by Guadalcanal militants. They 
went on a rampage forcing Malaitan's from settled villages by harrassing, 
abducting or aggressive confrontation. In some incidents these confrontations 
proved fatal.2 On 31 July 1999 the Royal Solomon Islands Police clashed 
with the Guadalcanal militants resulting in the death of four militants at 
Mount Austin, outside of the capital. The four had allegedly threatened a 
group of Malaitans working in their vegetable gardens. The matter was 
2 See genera lly Amnesty International SOLOMON ISLANDS, A forgotlen conflict (Amnesty 
International , August 2000). 
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reported to the police, they turned with automatic weapons and shot dead the 
four men after they allegedly fired shots.3 
Prior to the Mount Austin shoot-out the police raided a Guadalcanal 
militant camp in the north of Guadalcanal. They seized home made weapons 
and arrested one member of the Isatabu Freedom Movement. In retaliation, 
the Isatabu Freedom Movement raided a village on the Guadalcanal plains 
and kidnapped an off duty prison warder, a Malaita.4 The growing violence 
on Guadalcanal carried out by the Isatabu Freedom Movement resulted in 
more then 20, OOO Malaitans fleeing their homes and returning back to 
Malaita or became refugees in Honiara. 5 
Honiara became a Malaita stronghold surrounded by roadblocks 
cutting off the rest of Guadalcanal, under the control of the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement. Consequently, police control on Guadalcanal became restricted to 
the national capital while the conflict mounted. Many of these Malaitan 
people lost most of their properties. Following the closing down of major 
commercial companies such as the Solomon Islands Plantation Limited 
resulted in the loss of 65% of 1,800 employees. 
The then Solomon Islands Prime Minister Ulufa'alu claimed that it 
was a political construction and blamed the opposition businessmen and 
politicians for encouraging the violence by Guadalcanal militants.6 The cause 
of the eruption of violence was claimed to be a result of politicisation of the 
different islander-identities by political leaders. For example, in December 
1998, the Guadalcanal Premier Ezekiel Alebua publicly requested that settlers 
in Honiara must respect Guadalcanal people and their cultures. He also 
demanded that the national government should pay compensation for the 
capital, Honiara, because it was on Guadalcanal Province land. 7 
3 Peter Byrne " Intimidation against settlers continues in Solomon Islands" (131h August 1999) 
<http: //www/wsws.org/a1ticles/ 1999/aug1999/sol-a 13 .shtml> (Last accessed I 0111 June 2002). 
4 Byrne, above. 
5 Volker Boge "Solomon Islands" in Working Paper No. 1/2001 Conflict Potential and 
Violent Conflict in the South Paci.fie (University of Hamburg Research Unit of Wars, 
Armament and Development, 200 I) 27. 
6 Amnesty International , above, 3/4 . 
7 Catherine Jun "Unrest in the Solomons" <http: //www.cs.org/ internships/solomons.htm> 
(Last accessed 81 September 2002). 
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The degree of violence carried out by Guadalcanal militias reflected 
the depth of emotion and intensity of resentment against settlers on 
Guadalcanal that has evolved for decades. The incidents since the eruption of 
the of conflict depicted the levels of hatred and violence that the Isatabu 
Freedom Movement was prepared to indulge in if their demands were not 
met. This could be labelled as ethnonational behaviour because the actions of 
the Guadalcanal militants was a pursuit of their human needs in light of 
confrontation with the dominant Malaitans. In response to the IFM violence 
campaign, Malaitan men formed the Malaitan Eagle Force. 
The Malaitan Eagle Force fought against the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement and started to intimidate Guadalcanal people. As a result, 
approximately 10, OOO Guadalcanal people fled into remote areas within 
rural Guadalcanal due to fear of Malaitan Eagle Force repraisal. 8 The 
situation became complicated because there was an ethnic imbalance in the 
national police service. 75% of the police officers were Malaitans.9 Hence, 
when the Malaita Eagle Force was formed the State could do little to curb the 
escalation of violence into conflict. 
The Malaita Eagle Force on 17 January 2000 raided the police 
armoury at Auki, capital of Malaita Province. Later, the militant group 
resorted to violence to increase political pressure on the govermnent to pay 
compensation for the attacks committed by IFM. 10 Subsequently, the security 
situation gradually deteriorated because both the Isatabu Freedom Movement 
and Malaitan Eagle Force pressured the national government to meet their 
demands. The national government addressed the situation by coming up with 
a series of peace agreements but both militant groups continuously breached 
them. Revenge continued between the two groups. 
On 5 June 2000, the MEF supported by paramilitary police officers 
acted without authorisation and carried out a coup. The then Prime Minister 
Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was forced to resign and parliament was pressured to 
8 Amnesty International SOLOMON ISLANDS, A forgotten conflict (Amnesty International, 
August 2000) 3. 
9 Amnesty International , above, 7. 
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elect a successor. This was claimed to be a joint operation between MEF and 
the paramilitary police officers. However, MEF and the paramilitary later 
used stolen police weapons for the coup bperation to increase their military 
operations against the IFM and Guadalcanal civilians. 11 On 30 June 2000, the 
Malaita spokesperson Andrew Nori threatened 'all out war' if there was no 
newly elected Prime Minister to replace Ulufa'alu. As result, Manasseh 
Sogavare was elected to succeed Ulufa'alu and a new government referred to 
as Coalition for National Unity, Reconcilliation and Peace was formed. 12 
Since the election of the Sogavare government the MEF continued on 
with what it called 'Operation Eagle Storm' against the IFM controlled 
territory in rural Guadalcanal areas. 13 Law and Order gradually deteriorated 
leaving the population vulnerable to the excesses of paramilitary groups and 
criminal opportunist. The police force became dysfunctional. Militants 
continued with violent activities by carrying out executions, indiscriminate 
shootings, deliberate and arbitrary killing, torture, threats and harassment on 
the mass. 14 In most cases, the two militant groups would carry out attacks on 
citizens based on their ethnicity. 
10 Amnesty International, above, 5. 
11 Amnesty International, above, 6. 
12 Amnesty International, above. 
13 Amnesty International , above. 
14 Amnesty International , above. 
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III HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT 
A Protectorate Legacy 
Solomon Islanders became subject to British rule when the British 
Government enacted the Pacific Order in Council 1893. The interest in the 
Solomon Islands grew as Europeans gradually made contacts with the locals. 
Britain became concerned about the conflicts that occurred between the locals 
and its subjects, particularly those involved in labour recruiting for 
Queensland and Fiji. 15 Subsequently, under the Western Pacific Order in 
Council 1877 the governor of Fiji was empowered as a High Commissioner 
for the Western Pacific. His responsibility was for regulating contacts 
involving British subjects and the people of the islands that had no European 
country as their ruler. 
European countries gradually had an interest in the pacific and this 
contributed towards the demarcation of boundaries between islands. For 
example, in 1886 German interest in the northern Solomons as a source of 
labour, and a British willingness to protect Australia from foreign neighbours 
constituted the dividing up of the Solomons into German and British spheres 
of influence.16 The division of the jurisdiction of the Solomons was enforced 
under the Berlin Declaration in 1886. 17 Germany and Britain shared their 
interest over the Solomons and continued to increase their activities during 
the eighteenth century. Both Germany and Britain we equally concerned 
about how labour recruitment was carried out in the Pacific. 
However, the concerns of the German and British were more for their 
people venturing into the pacific and getting killed by islanders incited by the 
conduct of the ' slave traders ' rather than the protection of local inhabitants. 18 
Britain moved to annex the Southern Solomons as a protectorate in 1893 and 
15 Sam Alasia " Politics" in Hugh Larney (ed) Pies Blong lumi: Solomon Islands the past four 
thousand years (IPS , Suva, 1989) 137, 140. 
16 Alasia, above . 
17 Solomon Mamaloni "The Road To Independence" in Ron Crocombe and Esau Tuza (eds) 
Independence, Dependence, Interdependence: The First 10 Years of Solomon Islands 
Independence (Government Printing Press, Honiara, 1992) 7 , 13. 
18 Mamaloni , above. 
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this led to administration. The annexation by Britain under the Pacific Order 
in Council 1893 was for the strengthening of Britain' s claim on Guadalcanal, 
Malaita, New Georgia group, Makira, Savo, Ngnella and the Russells. 19 
These islands prior to British rule had their own social system to be complied 
with and authorities who must be obeyed. They were islands whose 
inhabitants were already self-sufficient with the basic requirements of life and 
had their own identities and entities.20 
The gradual merging of the islands by Britain under its demarcation 
strategies was mainly for administrative purposes. Notably, the declaration of 
the islands as a protectorate territory of Britain led to the reorganisation of the 
islands under one country referred to as Solomon Islands. This was a divine 
creation that overlooked the fact that Solomon Islands was made up of a 
number of small and sep,:µ-ate ' island nations ' . These are referred to as 
Malaita, Guadalcanal, Makira, Nende, Vanikoro, Utupua, Reefs, 
Tikopia/Anuta, Duff Islands, Isabel, Ulawa, Ngella, Savo, Rennell/Belona, 
Russell Islands, Marovo, New Georgia, Kolombangara, Simbo, Gizo, 
Rannonga, Choiseul, Sikaiana, Lord Howe and Shortland.21 
The combining of these islands under one sovereign authority 
provided the background for Britain to administer the islands. In other words, 
it was for administrative convenience that the islands were combined to form 
the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. There was no evaluation or study of 
the prerequisites for creating a nation before merging the islands into one 
sovereign authority. Solomon Mamaloni described this as " .. . the Solomon 
Islands Community has never been a Nation".22 This demonstrated that in 
Solomon Islands, nation of islands existed during the pre-contact era. Britain 
never considered this complexity when it merged the islands. 
Charles Woodford was the first Resident Commissioner who was 
appointed in 1893 but took residence in 1896. He was directly responsible to 
the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific based in Suva, Fiji but 
19 Mamaloni , above. 
20 Mamaloni , above, 14. 
21 Mamaloni , above, I 0. 
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distance and transport virtually accorded Woodford the authority of a 
Governor.23 Woodford's economic aim to generate more revenue for the 
Protectorate made him to be in favour of the concept of customary land 
alienation. The idea to alienate customary land was embraced by an 
unfounded a sumption and British myth that ignored the complexities that 
existed in relation to customary land tenure on the different islands 
throughout the Solomons. Woodford did not carry out any proper 
investigation or urvey to determine the tatus of land ownership in the areas 
such as Yonavona, North New Georgia, Islands in the Manning Strait and 
South Coasts of Santa Isabel and Choiseul. Most of his observation was from 
the foredeck of the Rob Roy in 1899.24 
The fir t land regulation enacted under the British administration 
declared that land in Solomon Island was uninhabited land or waste land.25 
Under the land regulation introduced by the Briti h administrator , the 
concept of freehold, leasehold and perpetual estate wa introduced. 
Subsequently, land alienation wa introduced. The British admini tration was 
instrumental in facilitating the transfer of land to Briti h ubject either as 
freehold if it was customary land or lea ehold if it was wa te-land . Thi wa 
all part of the British government' administrative policy of land alienation. 
The policy of land acquisition under the variou land laws during the 
protectorate era created complications in later year when olomon 1 land 
became independent. 
ror instance, 111 Ru ell Island the alienation or land for the 
development or coconut plantations in the late 1800s by the L vers Pacific 
Ltd caused arguments between the state and the people. Land di pute 
emerged when, Pavuvu Island after Marving Brothers Timber Ltd, a 
Malay ian registered logging company tarted logging on the island in 1985. 
Prior to that, the Levers Pacific Timber, a a ub idiary or the same company 
22 Mamaloni, above. 
23 Mamaloni , above, 13. 
24 Judith Bennett A Wealth of the S0lo111o11s: A histo, y q/a Pacific archipelago 1800 1978 
(Univcr ity or I lawaii Prcs , I lonolulu, 1989) 13 1. 
25 cc generally Queen Regulation No. 4 or 1896. 
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was also involved in a dispute in 1981 with the land owners at Enoghae in 
North New Georgia. After independence alienated land remained a source of 
conflict on Guadalcanal and other areas such as Pavuvu and New Georgia 
because only marginal benefit is received from it. These problems evolved as 
a result of poor British government policies during the protectorate era. 
B Constitutionalism 
From 1960s to the early 1970s Britain was preparing Solomon Islands 
for constitutional independence. Britain undertook this process because 
Solomon Islands derived little or no economic benefit as a country. During 
this period Britain was encouraged the establishment of the Palm Oil Project 
by the Commonwealth Development Corporation.26 Administratively, in 1968 
Solomon Islands was divided into four districts, the Western, Central, Malaita 
and Eastern. Each of the districts was controlled by a District Commissioner 
and assisted by one to three District Officers depending on the size of the 
district. 27 
In 1968 the Colonial Government introduced constitutional 
development based on discussions between the High Commission and the 
elected members of the Legislative Council. The recommendations advocated 
an elected majority in a single Legislative Council supported by Executive 
Committees. Therefore, a Governing Council was established in 1970 but 
lasted one term only. Open election ballot for the members of the Legislative 
Council was encouraged except Temotu returned their representatives 
through an electoral college.28 
All elected members were part of Executive Committees. They were 
directly involved in executive decision making. However, this system of 
government was considered as time consuming, slowed down making of 
decisions, discourage party politics which was basis of the Westminster 
26 Sir Baddeley Devesi "Independence or Dependence" in Ron Crocombe and Esau Tuza 
(eds) Independence, Dependence, Interdependence; The First JO Years of Solomon Islands 
Independence (Government Printing Press, Honiara (Solomon Island) 1992) I, 2. 
27 Devesi, above, 2 
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system.29 The Colonial Administration retained power in the Legislature with 
the majority of 14 official members who were Heads of Government 
Departments. During this period Britain accelerated its plans to give Solomon 
Islands independence. 
The idea of a Governing Council was to encourage a 'home grown' 
system of government. There would be no opposition and the decisions of 
government would be based on consensus in order to avoid creating divisions 
in an already diverse nation. Those that were in favour of the Governing 
Council felt that such system was similar to the Melanesian way of good 
government because every parliamentarian would be part of the day to day 
running of Government both at the Executive Committee level and at the 
sitting of the whole house. Such government system was suitable for 
Solomon Islands because it avoid unnecessary arguments since every member 
would work together for a common good. 
The colonial administrators and local politicians did not share this 
view. The colonial administrators did not accept the idea of a Governing 
Council from the start and came out with arguments to discourage the system 
from working by saying that it was an expensive and time consuming form of 
government.30 They were in favour of the Westminster system because it 
would expedite independence and relieve them of their financial burden. It 
was also argue a Governing Council would not allow for the development of 
political pai1ies, which were essential for a clear majority with which to 
govern. 31 Therefore, when Britain granted Solomon Islands independence in 
1978 a Westminster Parliamentary system of government was adopted. 
28 Devesi , above, 3. 
29 Devesi , above. 
30 Devesi , above, 4. 
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IV SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
A State v Citizen 
Citizens and the State of Solomon Islands relate with each other 
within the rule of law through the legislature, executive and judiciary. The 
rule of law defines the boundary upon which this relationship can prosper and 
flourish. Any issues that citizens wish to bring to the attention of the State 
must be channeled through the appropriate arms of the State. Neither citizen 
nor the State can operate alone in a democratic country such as the Solomon 
Islands. 
However, after independence the competency of the State to deal with 
issues raised by citizens was questioned. There were cases that happened after 
independence, which put the State to a test in terms of how it could operate 
legitimately. These cases later could be argued as some of the factors that 
contributed towards the evolving of grievance among citizens resulting in 
conflict. How the State dealt with these cases seemed to have been 
unconventional or unconstitutional. As a result, there was gradual distrust and 
resentment against how the State operated. Three cases can be used to 
illustrate the process of grievance, which later escalated into conflict. 
The first case was the Guadalcanal Province petition in 1988 for state 
government, return of alienated land and payment of compensation for 
murder committed against Guadalcanal people. The State did not deal 
promptly with the petitions made by the Guadalcanal Province. The petitions 
for state government and return of alienated land were national issues32 but 
the State did not consider these as serious. Compensation claim for murdered 
victims was dismissed by the State because appropriate State institutions such 
as the police and courts had already dealt with it. 
The second case was the defamatory statement that caused insult 
against Malaitans in 1989. An unknown culprit wrote a defamatory statement 
at the main market in Honiara, which resulted in more than a thousand 
3 1 Devesi, above. 
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Malaitans to violently demonstrate on the streets of Honiara and demanded 
compensation.33 Speculation had it that the culprit was from Rennell and 
Bellona, thus disgruntled Malaitan's pressured the suspect's Provincial 
Government to pay compensation. The State rescued the culprit's Provincial 
Government by paying SBD$200, OOO compensation to the Malaita 
Province34 despite no police investigation or a charge laid to establish 
whether a crime had been committed. Neither was there any civil suit for 
defamation. 
The third case was the rape allegation in 1998 that happened at 
Ruavatu Secondary School, which was owned by Guadalcanal Province. The 
female students from Malaita were alleging that an unknown rapist raped 
them. There was no police investigation carried out or conviction made for 
the rape allegation. Instead, disgruntled Malaitan parents or guardians 
approached the Guadalcanal Province for compensation. Guadalcanal 
Province refused to pay because there was no crime committed or civil suit 
brought against them. The State paid compensation instead by using the 
revenue sharing grants due to the Guadalcanal Province to settle the demand. 
The State overlooked the legitimate process in dealing with issues 
raised by citizens in these three cases. This has caused suspicion and distrust 
among citizens. As a result of the unconventional approach by the State the 
Guadalcanal Province resubmitted the petitions it made in 1988. The social 
and cultural opinion in Guadalcanal Province was that the State has already 
confused the ways it should relate with the people when dealing with issues. 
There was no faith that the State would deal fairly with the petitions of the 
Guadalcanal Province. Hence, disgruntled young men from Guadalcanal 
resorted to violence by forcing settlers, especially Malaitans on Guadalcanal 
to leave. This later resulted in a conflict. 
32 See Constitutional Review Committee Constitutional Review (CRC Report Vol.1 , Honiara, 
1987). 
33 See Tarcisius.Tara Kabutaulaka "The Guadalcanal Issue: A Frank Talk 1" (24
111 May 1999) 
<http: //www.geocities.com/jannico1aas/23a0699.htm1> (last accessed 28
111 February 2002). 
34 Kabutaulaka, above. 
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B Development 
Successive governments smce the protectorate era devised 
development plans to improve the living conditions of Solomon Islanders. 
Initially, Britain provided a grant in aid of 1 200 pounds to fund the 
administration of the protectorate when a new government was established in 
1896. 35 Therefore, Charles Woodford who was the first Resident 
Commissioner considered commercial plantations as a viable development 
paradigm that would raise extra capital for the administration of the 
Protectorate. As a result, Mr. Woodford encouraged foreign investors to 
invest in plantation agriculture. However, in order for foreign investment to 
progress Woodford realised that land and labour must be available. 
Therefore, the British administration formulated a policy of alienating 
land for large-scale plantation development. Prior to independence Britain 
developed commercial projects such as the Tuna industry in 1972 and the oil 
palm project established by the Commonwealth Development Corporation.36 
These commercial projects generated most of the revenue to run the country 
during the first 8 years after independence. However, the prices of the cash 
crops that were the revenue generating resources during the early 1980s were 
weakening on the world market. Cyclone Namu in 1986 caused a lot of 
damage to the major oil palm and the rice ventures on Guadalcanal.37 
The impact of the Cyclone in 1986 gradually facilitated development 
to gradually take a twisting tale. National leaders opted for large scale logging 
practices as another avenue to generate income for the country. As result, 
there was tremendous export of round logs at an unsustainable rate that 
brought significant cash flow to the country. On contrary, between 1994 and 
1997 the national government gave SBD$109 million as duty remissions to 
35 Judith Bennett A Wealth of the Solomon islands: A Histo,y of a Pacific Archipelago 1800 -
/9 78 (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987) I 05. 
36 Sir Baddeley Devesi " Independence or Dependence" in Ron Crocombe and Essau Tuza 
(eds) Independence, Dependence and Interdependence. The First 10 years of Solomon 
Islands Independence (Government Printing Press, Honiara (Solomon Islands) 1992) 7, 17. 
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logging companies at the expense of the national revenue.38 However, behind 
this destructive development paradigm of the export of Solomon Islands tree 
wealth to Southeast Asia was corruption. 
A few accumulated wealth from the new logging industry and became 
rich at the cost of many village and urban people. The national government 
gave subsidies to businesses, particularly logging companies and their close 
associates at the expense of rural based logging activities. Despite heavy 
criticism that the rate of logging exports were unsustainable those that were in 
charge, primarily the national leaders felt that the cutting down of the 
Solomon Islands tree wealth was the prompt avenue for generating revenue to 
run the country.39 Despite public reaction against destructive logging 
practices the national government did formulate alternative policies to 
discourage logging. 
According to the Central Bank's 1994 Annual Report it was obvious 
that the production of 830, OOO cubic metres of whole log exports was not 
progressing on a sustainable leve!.40 This has created considerable concern 
among many Solomon Island resource owners because it was evident that 
Solomon Islands economy was caught in a spiral resource depletion and 
unsustainable development. Moreover, logging practices became focus of 
controversy because there was exposure of bribery paid to government 
Ministers from logging companies. From media reports it was revealed that 
US$2.2 million was paid in bribes from the Intergrated Forestry Industry, a 
subsidiary of Malaysian Company Kumpulan Emas, to Ministers and other 
4 1 government employees. 
Significantly, the encouragement of logging practices apart from large 
scale commercial agriculture such as oil palm and coconut plantation 
reflected that how development was facilitated constituted the sustaining of 
37 John Roughan "Solomon Islands: The Quick, Easy Fix" (24
1
h May 2001) 
( <http://www/scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0205/SOO 132.htm> (Last accessed 24
111 
September 2002). 
38 Roughan, above. 
39 Roughan, above. 
40 "Solomons Logging" <http: //archive.greenpeace.org/-comms/forestry/ log.html> (Last 
accessed 81" August 2002). 
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injustices or harms.42 Such injustices or harm was later transformed into 
aggression and violence that escalated into conflict. Coser described such 
conflict as: 
. .. a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and 
scarce resources, in which the aims of conflicting parties are 
not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralise, 
injure, or eliminate their rivals .43 
Based on Coser's definition it could be held that how development was 
carried out in Solomon Islands was one of the sources of conflict. 
C Ethnicity 
Geographically, Solomon Islands has a land mass of 27, 556 square 
kilometres that spreads over 992 islands and is located 10 degrees south of the 
equator.44 Melanesians make up 95 % of the population while the other 5% 
comprised mainly of Polynesians and Micronesians.45 There are over 120 
indigenous language groups and significant local differences in culture.46 
People from different islands had their own identities and entities that were 
self reliant as well as own social structures and authorities that they must 
obey.47 When Solomon Islands became an independent state in 1978 ethnic 
groups were destined to be networked into a modem nation. 
Solomon Islanders identify themselves more closely with their cultural 
or island groups than the modern nation of Solomon Islands. With such 
4 1 "Solomons Logging", above. 
42 John Houainamo Naitoro "Solomon Islands conflict: demands for hi storical rectification 
and restorative justice" (2000) Pacific Economic Bulletin <http://peb.anu .edu.au> (Last 
accessed 81h August 2002). 
43 Lewis A Coser Conflict: Social Aspects (Macmillan, New York, 1968) as cited in Naitoro, 
above. 
44 Lonely Planet "Solomon Islands" 
<http://www.lonelvplanet.com/destinations/pacific/solomon islands/hi sttorv. htm> (Last 
accessed I ' 1 August 2002). 
45 "Solomon Islands - Country Information" 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/solomon islands brief.html> (Last accessed 8'" August 2002). 
46 Bob Burton Rights- Solomon Islands: Land Tensions Spill Over, Peace Plan Shaky 
<http: //www.oneworld.org/ips2/ july99/ l5 59 007.html> (Last accessed 8
1
" August 2002). 
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tremendous diversity there was a struggle for national consciousness because 
people continued to cling on to their cultural niches.48 People aligned 
themselves according to district, village or provincial level and it was through 
this common identity that people could have the driving capacity to express 
their grieve or frustrations. Donald Horowitz realised such tendency when he 
stated "in divided societies, ethnic affiliations are powerful, permeative, 
passionate and pervasive".49 
Despite the uniting of the different islands under the modem nation of 
Solomon Islands tensions had ebbed and flowed for some years, which 
erupted in 1998 constituting a conflict between people from Guadalcanal and 
Malaita. This signifies that ethnic difference is one of the sources of conflict 
in Solomon Islands because there is no common identity. Donald Horowitz 
explained this as: 
In severely divided societies, ethnicity finds its way into a 
myriad of issues: development plans, education 
controversies, trade union affairs, land policy, business 
policy, tax policy. Characteristically, issues that would 
elsewhere be relegated to the category of routine 
administration assume a central place on the political agenda 
of ethnically divided societies. 50 
The explanation given by Donald Horowitz seemed to be the case in 
Solomon Island where ethnic groups such as the Isatabu Freedom Movement 
or the Malaita Eagle Force transformed genuine issues into what could be 
interpreted as an ethnic conflict. Before the creation of militancy by both the 
Isatabu Freedom Movement and the Malaita Eagle Force the core issues were 
the return of alienated land, state government, compensation claims and 
47 Solomon Mamaloni "The Road To Independence" in Ron Crocombe and Esau Tuza (eds) 
Independence, Dependence and Interdependence. The First JO Years of Solomon Islands 
Independence (Government Printing Press, Honiara (Solomon Islands) 1992) 7, 14. 
48 Gordon Nanau "Uniting The Fragments: Solomon Islands constitutional reforms" ( 2000 
Development Research Symposium: South Pacific Futures (FDC) Conference, Brisbane, 22-
24July 2002) 4. 
49 Donald Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, Barkely, 1985) 
12. 
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development. As the conflict erupted between the two militant groups the 
issues raised became personalised within an ethnic spectrum. 
People resorted to ethnic affiliation and than mobilised to demonstrate 
their frustration. The creation of the Isatabu Freedom Movement and the 
Malaita Eagle Force are examples that show group affiliation based upon 
ethnicity. The involvement of these two militant groups in the Solomon 
Islands conflict demonstrated that the lack of national consciousness or 
common identity plays a role in defining the conflict. 
D Government Policies 
Inadequate government policies since the protectorate was another 
element that seemed to have caused the Solomon Islands conflict. From the 
historical sketch, it can be deduced that there were poor policies of customary 
land administration. These land policies were developed primarily to 
encourage the improvement of Solomon Islands domestic economy through 
agriculture development and large scale exploitation of natural resources. 
Hence, during and after the protectorate era natural resources such as logging, 
oil palm and the distribution of the benefits from customary land has been and 
remains a contentious issue. 
The government's policy of land alienation for large scale cropping 
such oil palm and coconut plantations provided landowners to accrue benefits 
that were only marginal. For instance, on the Guadalcanal plains a total of 1, 
478 hectares of land was acquired in the 1970s for oil palm plantation by the 
Solomon Islands Plantation Limited. Guadalcanal landowners own only a 2 
percent share in the Company, while the British registered Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) owns 68% shares and the Solomon Islands 
-1 
government 30%.) 
50 Horowitz, above. 
5 1 Tarcisiu Tara Kabutaulaka " Beyond Ethnicity: The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal 
Crisis in Solomon Islands" (2000) 
<http://rspas.anu.edu .au/melanesia/tarcisiusworkingpaper.htm> (Last accessed I 0
1
h August 
2002). 
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Apart from the shares, landowners receive annually, SI$100/ NZ$30 
per hectare as land rental and SI$500/ NZ$175 per hectare as premium. 
Guadalcanal landowners throughout the decades have been making efforts to 
increase their benefits from the alienated land. 52 However, successive 
governments did not address the issue positively, thereby provoking grievance 
among Guadalcanal landowners against the State and other settlers. 
Guadalcanal landowners started to revolt against the State and force people to 
leave the island of Guadalcanal. 
Significantly, disgruntled young men from Guadalcanal showed their 
frustrations by resorting to violence. Donald Horowitz explained this as: 
When ethnic violence occurs, unranked groups usually aim 
not at social transformation, but at something approaching 
sovereign autonomy, the exclusion of parallel ethnic groups 
from a share of power, and ofter reversion - by expulsion or 
extermination - to an idealised, ethnically homogeneous 
status quo ante.53 
While the description was written about conflicts in nations in Asia 
and Africa it sums up what was happening in the Solomon Islands. The 
Guadalcanal people after more than 20 years of waiting for their grievance to 
be addressed constructively were the first to revolt against the policies of 
State. 54 Such revolt was extended against other citizens who were either 
squatters, settlers or people that migrated to Guadalcanal to work on large 
commercial plantations such as the oil palm and coconut industries. Then 
Malaitans armed themselves and retaliated. 
52 Kabutaulaka, above. 
53 Donald Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, Barkely, 1985) 
31. 
54 John Roughan "Solomon Islands: The Quick, Easy Fix"(241" May 200 l) 
<http://www/scoop.co.nz/mason/storics/HL0205/SOO 132.htm> (Last accessed 241" September 
2002). 
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V CONFLICT TO CRISIS (1998 - 2002) 
A Militants 
The beginning of militant uprising was witnessed towards the end of 
1998 after angry young men from Guadalcanal grouped and called 
themselves the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (later renamed Isatabu 
Freedom Fighters or Isatabu Freedom Movement). However, the Isatabu 
Freedom Fighters were not under one single unified organisation. They had 
no clear structures of command and control but consisted of several local 
groups acting independently of one another to a large extent. The two main 
groups are the 'Command East Coast' and ' Command West Coast' . 55 
The 'Command East Coast' is a traditional fundamentalist group that 
existed for a long time and is based in the structurally underdeveloped and 
neglected south coast of Guadalcanal. The group is connected to the Moro 
movement that revolted against the British during the protectorate. The 
' Command West Coast' group is made up of educated younger people who 
experienced urban life and have a good grasp of political discourse. 56 They 
made petitions for self-determination for the population of Guadalcanal and 
greater autonomy for their province. Apart from these two groups criminal 
elements attached themselves to the Isatabu Freedom Movement primarily to 
enrich themselves by through arson, robbery and taking of hostages. 57 
The Isatabu Freedom Movement started to be aggressive after its 
formation by terrorising people, particularly Malaitans and forcing them to 
leave Guadalcanal. Such aggression according to the Frustration Agression 
theory may be due to the fact that human needs always exceed the supply, 
thus conflict can be traced back to an actor' s failure to obtain what it needs. 
However, this theory was discredited by the Social Leaming theory, which is 
based on the assumption that aggression is not innate or instinctual but 
55 Volker Boge "Solomon Islands" in Working Paper o. 1/200 I Conflict Potential and 
Violent Conflict in the South Pacific (University of Hamburg Research Unit of Wars, 
Armament and Development, 200 I) 30 . 
56 Boge, above. 
57 Boge, above. 
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actually learned through the process of socialisation. Therefore, based on the 
Social Learning theory it could be explained that the aggressive behaviour by 
the Isatabu Freedom Movement militants was due to the process of 
socialisation. 
Many young men that joined the Isatabu Freedom Movement grew to 
witness their people have become second class and land-losing citizens on 
their own island. 58 Malaitans had migrated to Guadalcanal and became the 
dominant group. They sought employment in the modern sector, on the 
plantations, in the fishing industry, in the only goldmine of the country,59 in 
trade and above in the public service.60 Malaitan inhabitants became the 
business and political elite on Guadalcanal. 61 In the country's highest learning 
institution, Solomon Islands College of Higher Education Malaitans make up 
75%.62 
Social inequality was inevitable with the influx of Malaitans and this 
has made the indigenous population of Guadalcanal, particularly young men 
to feel disadvantaged. As a result, there was a growing feeling of resentment 
and frustration evolving for decades that influenced young Guadalcanal men 
to be aggressive. One could sense the depth of emotion and sheer intensity of 
aggression from comments made by the Guadalcanal people as result of the 
social inequalities. Take for example the words of one of the IFF/ IFM 
leaders, George Gray: 
[w]e want all Malaitans in Guadalcanal repatriated back to 
their land. We want them gone . .. if [this demand was] not 
met ... we can mount an attack on Honiara and kill all the 
Malaitans, wipe them out.63 
58 Catherine Jun "Unrest in the Solomons" (2000) 
<http: //www.cs.org/internships/solomons.htm> (Last accessed 81 September 2002). 
59 Gold Ridge Mine. 
60 Boge, above, 27. 
6 1 Jun, above. 
62 Marilyn Pryor " Marist priest observer at Solomon Islands elections in December" 
(February 2002) Wei-Com Wellington and Palmerstone North 9. 
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Subsequently, the Isatabu Freedom Movement pursued with force the 
interest by burning houses, attacked villages inhabited by Malaitans. 
Thousands of Malaitan who settled on the out skirt of Honiara were driven 
from their homes by Guadalcanal militants who armed themselves with horn~ 
made rifles and antique rifles excavated from World War II caches. 64 In 
response to the IFM's violent campaign against the State and Malaitan settlers 
on Guadalcanal, Malaitan men living in Honiara and those who fled from IFM 
operations in rural Guadalcanal formed vigilante groups on the outskirts of 
Honiara. Malaitan men who had evacuated their families to Malaita after 
many lost jobs and homes joined the vigilante groups, thus the number 
increased in mid 1999. 65 
The vigilante groups were reportedly trained and armed by serving or 
former Malaitan police officers. The groups gradually became active after it 
was perceived that the government was not actively dealing with their 
grievances as a result of the violence committed by IFM. On 17th January 
2000 members of the vigiliants groups raided the police armoury at Auki, 
capital of Malaita and later publicly announced that they represent the Malaita 
Eagle Force. This was a militant group formed by aggrieved Malaitan people 
who claimed to protect the interest of Malaitans by pressurising the 
government to pay compensation for Malaitans loss of lives and property from 
IFM attacks. 66 
In February 2000 the Governor General, Sir John Ini Lapli declared 
both the IFM and MEF as criminal organisations. This resulted in the MEF 
refusing to attend any peace talks until the ban was suspended. However, 
months after the formation of the MEF skirmishes and revenge killings 
between the militant groups started to build up. As a result, there were cases 
of human rights abuses but the police responded to the emerging conflict with 
63 Peter Byrne "Solomon Islands accord paves the way for further conflict" (61h July 1999) 
<http: //www.wsws.org/articles/ 1999/ jul 1999/solo-j06.shtml> (Last accessed Ii" September 
2002). 
64 Catherine Jun "Unrest in the Solomons" (2000) 
<http://www.cs .org/internships/solomons.htm> (Last accessed 81 September 2002). 
65 Amnesty International SOLOMON ISLANDS, A forgotten conflict (Amnesty International , 
August 2000) 4. 
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restraint and hesitation because internal ethnic division, lack of equipment, 
transport and training. 67 Consequently, the State became handicapped in 
dealing effectively with the conflict insurgence. Hence, law and order 
gradually deteriorated. 
B Civilian Coup 
The militant upraising eventually resulted in the Malaita Eagle Force 
staging a coup on 5 June 2000. The Malaita Eagle Force put the Prime 
Minister and Governor General under house arrest and demanded the Prime 
Minister to resign.68 The Malaita Eagle Force spokesman, Andrew Nori, 
claimed that the Prime Minister failed to contain ethnic violence on 
Guadalcanal. Therefore, the aim of the coup was to 'restore law and order and 
confidence in the Government'. 69 This seemed to be the result of 
inconsistency in terms of the government's policy of peace before justice and 
demands of displaced Malaitans for justice in the forn1 of compensation before 
peace. 
The staging of the coup demonstrated Malaita Eagle Force' s objective 
was to take control of the State apparatus. Generally, seeking control of the 
State through actions such as the coup indicated that Malaitan militants were 
prepared to ensure that their needs were met. 70 Malaita Eagle Forces gained 
control of Honiara as if they were the masters and had the power to 
manipulate of the State apparatus to their advantage. The demand for the 
resignation of the Prime Minister and the installation of a new government 
after the coup was a political move that would give the MEF more benefit in 
terms of their demand for compensation. 
66 Amnesty International, above, 5/6. 
67 Amnesty International , above, 9. 
68 "Solomons fall to violent coup, civil war a possibility" 
<http ://www.adventurere.co.nz/collection/news/solomons/profile.html> (Last accessed 3th 
August 2002). 
69 "Solomons fall to violent coup, civil war a possibility", above. 
70 William G. Cunningham Jr. Conflict Theory and the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
<http://cain.ul st.ac.uk/contlict/cunningham.htm> (Last accessed 18th September 2002). 
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The coup that was engineered by Andrew Nori and the Malaita Eagle 
Force on 5 June 2000 undermined the democratic principles of electing a new 
government. The police aided Civilian Coup was a quick way of changing a 
government that was gingerly pushing for greater transparency, financial 
accountability and fairness. 71 These were issues that were not to the liking of 
the architec of the coup and their campaigners. The coup was carried out to 
help a few gain, especially Malaitan militants, at the expense of many citizens. 
This undermined people's trust in the government. 
The justification for the carrying out of the coup was to save Honiara 
from militant invasion, claims for compensation for lost possessions in the 
social unrest of 1999 and 2000 be paid and finally avenge the 20, OOO plus 
displaced Malaitans driven out by Guadalcanal militants. 72 However, the 
hidden agenda behind the coup was to install a new government into power 
through a barrel of a gun, a government that would be more easily persuaded 
to follow orders. The Isatabu Freedom Movement initially did not recognise 
the new government that was formed after the coup because it was believed to 
be a Malaita Eagle Force construction. Many people did not perceive the 
government after the coup as legitimate. As a result, there was widespread 
lawlessness and looting. 
C Law and order problem 
The militant appraisal was the contributing factor behind the break 
down of law and order in Solomon Islands. The Guadalcanal militants were 
blamed for creating a sense of statelessness. However, their activities were 
carried out on the outskirts of Honiara. It was after the 5111 of June 2000 that 
caused complete chaos because there was no effective mechanism to provide 
law and order. The MEF, supported by paramilitary police officers used stolen 
police weapons and equipment to fight against the IFM and Guadalcanal 
7 1 John Roughan "Country's Coup Costs" ( I 011, June 200 I) 
( <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/solomonsarticles.htm# I> (Last accessed 201h June 2002). 
72 Roughan , above. 
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civilians. Since the coup the MEF used State owned weapons for its 
'Operation Eagle Storm' against the IFM controlled territory of rural 
Guadalcanal. 73 
Militant activities have created a law and order vacuum in Honiara and 
throughout other islands. Prior to the coup there was no sign of massive 
criminal activities because only one group of people, particularly Guadalcanal 
militants use violent means to demonstrate their grievances and frustration. 
When the Malaita Eagle Force responded and took over the State apparatus 
criminals took advantage of the situation and benefited. There was no 
effective policing because the Malaita dominated paramilitary Police Field 
Force that was, changed sides. 74 Rather than maintaining loyalty to the State, 
much of the Police Field Force yielded to provincialism and ethnicity. 
The civilian population of Solomon Islands suffered most as a result of 
the break down in law and order. All parties to the conflict were responsible 
for such chaos. 75 The break down in law and order caused the civilian 
population to be vulnerable to the excesses of paramilitary groups and 
criminal opportunists. Internally displaced people, ethnic minorities, women 
and teenage girls were the ones vulnerable to human rights abuses or common 
crimes because there was no effective policing to provide security and 
· 76 protect10n. 
It was evident that after the coup the criminal activities in and around 
Honiara were alarming. The coup seemed to be catalyst for this entire 
uncontrollable criminal uprising because like the IFM the Joint MEF/ 
Paramilitary group was not lawfully established since there was no legislative 
enactment. Therefore, when the Joint MEF/ Paramilitary group took over 
Honiara other legitimate police posts in other Provinces were cut off resulting 
in the encouragement for an increase of criminal activities. Maintaining 
discipline by either IFM or Joint MEF/ Paramilitary was not possible. As a 
73 Amnesty International SOLOMON ISLANDS: A forgotten conflict (Amnesty International , 
August 2000) 6. 
74 Amnesty International , above. 
75 Amnesty International , above. 
76 Amnesty International , above, 7 . 
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result, criminal elements that were part of these groups went on a rampage by 
stealing vehicles, harassing citizens and indulging in other criminal activities. 
A disciplined and an effective police force to curb these criminal 
activities was missing. Therefore, the State was handicapped to adequately 
provide protection and security to its citizens. The rising in criminal activities 
was described by the High Court ruling in Bartholomew Ulufa'alu v Attorney-
General as ".. . [There was] widespread looting, stealing, harassment and 
intimidation of innocent citizens in the Capital, with the absence of an 
effective police force ... "77 Even after the signing of the Townsville Peace 
Agreement the rate of robbery78 and murder cases79 remained high. The 
division in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force along provincial or ethnic 
lines caused inefficiency to enforce the law by arresting the law-breakers or 
providing security. 
While there has been a newly elected government smce December 
2001 , the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement and the gradual return 
of arms there is still a law and order problem. Therefore, the democratic 
relationship between citizens and the State remains uncertain. The break 
down in law and order has made some gain more, through compensation 
payments, at the expense of others. Extortion through the form of 
compensation claims has become a major source of income for some. This 
has caused tremendous impact on the countries economy and the socio-
political structures. As a result, social inequality remains an issue that needs 
to be dealt with constructively or else Solomon Islands will continue to be 
prone for more conflict. 
77 (9 November 200 I) High Court of Solomon Islands, Civil Case No. 195 of 2000, Palmer 
ACJ. 
78 See for example Pina Nius Online "Solomon Islands: Armed gang rob ship in Honiara" (511, 
March 2002) <http://www.pacificislands.cc/pm22002/pinadefault.cfm ?pinaid=3840> (last 
accessed 611, March 2002). 
79 See Michael. Field "Solomon Islands Slipping into Anarchy" Wh March 2002) The 
Dominion New Zealand 25. 
30 
D Economic depression 
Since the militant appraisal towards 1998 Solomon Islands economy 
has experienced a sharp decline. The conflict has created residual effects 
because the tourist industry and export economies have been ruined. 
Warnings issued by overseas countries to their citizens not to travel to 
Solomon Islands caused a downfall in tourism. The Solomon Islands 
Plantation Limited that contributes a fifth of the country's SBD$370 million 
GDP from the export of palm oil was closed resulting in thousands of 
Malaitans unemployed. 80 
Not only did the palm oil industry shut down, the Gold Ridge Mine 
and the Solomon Taiyo, the largest fishing company of the Solomon Islands, 
faced the same fate. Even the Malaysian timber firms withdrew all business 
operations completely.81 The Australian and New Zealand governments first 
forbade their nationals to visit Solomon Islands and then ordered evacuation 
of resident nations. Plains and ships provided free passage to Brisbane. 
Solomon Islands' economic depression went from bad to worse. 
Approximately, 8000 jobs were lost as a result of the conflict. The gross 
national product dropped by around 40% and fish production dropped from a 
peak of 49, OOO tons in 1998 to 21 , 00082 tons by 2000 constituting more than 
75%.83 The country's debts were estimated to be approximately SBD$1 
million, which was almost twice the national budget. The central 
government's debt at the end of2000 reached about 75% of GDP and 65% of 
this was external debt and the gross external reserves were about US$6.5.84 
8° Catherine Jun "Unrest in the Solomons"(2000) 
<http://www.cs.org/internships/solomons.htm> (Last accessed 81 September 2002). 
81 Volker Boge "Solomon Islands" in Working Paper No. 1/2000 I Conflict Potential and 
Violent Conflict in the South Pacific (University of Hamburg Research Unit of Wars, 
Armament and Development, 200 I) 3 8. 
82 Satish Chand "Conflict to crisis in Solomon Islands" (I May 2002) 17 Pacific Economic 
Bulletin 155. 
83 Boge, above. 
84 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka "Solomon Islands Defence Force: Who is the Enemy?" (July 
200 I) <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/solomonsariicles.htm# I> (Last accessed 8th June 
2002). 
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These figures indicated that the Solomon Islands conflict since 1998 had an 
adverse effect on the country's economic survival. 
Investors' confidence and the country's budget were affected 
tremendously as a result of the conflict. The financial sector experienced the 
largest impact from the conflict because Solomon Islands' risk premium 
increased sharply, contributing to high interest rates on borrowing. Such 
pressure on the interest rate was further compounded as a result of the urge to 
fund growing budget deficits created by rising outlays largely to fund 
compensation payments to aggrieved groups, couple with falling revenue. 85 
The consequence of such trend was the sharp decline in investment than the 
fall in production. This suggested that the recovery in output would be slow 
in the short to medium term. 
The conflict has caused the Government debt now account for close to 
a third of the total assets of the domestic financial sector. However, the 
government was unable to service its debt commitments and this has made 
domestic financial institutions such as the National Provident Fund to be 
exposed to a high risk as well as holders of treasury bills. Such climate 
exposed the treasury to the difficult task in trying to manage cash flow. The 
Solomon Islands Treasury during the conflict period was also burdened with 
the task to ensure sufficient revenues for the payment of salaries of public 
servants because aggrieved parties drained the government budget by 
demanding compensation. 86 
The pressure on the government' s budgetary revenues in 2001 has 
forced the public sector to issue duty remissions as an alternate fom1 of 
compensation payment that gradually made the government insolvent. This 
trend of duty remission began during the Mamaloni era (1994 - 1997) when 
$109 million was squandered by giving massive duty remissions to logging 
85 Satish Chand " Conflict to crisis in Solomon Islands" ( I May 2002) 17 Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, 155. 
86 Chand, above. 
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companies, both foreign and local. 87 In 2001 the issued duty remissions that 
was worth more the SBD$7 million on beer and cigarettes.88 
The maintaining of responsible monetary policy became impossible 
during a time of conflict. The credibility of the State was questioned after the 
restructured bonds sponsored by the World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Program in 1999 failed. The Central Bank on a daily routine continues to 
protect the foreign reserves by capital controls, including on current 
transactions. The lending rates during the first quarter of 2001 was 15 .5% with 
deposit rates at 0.5% implying an interest rate margin of 15 percentage points. 
This is high both by international standards and in the context of a depressed 
economy.89 
The conflict has exacerbated the nations' ability to recover its 
economy and production output. Consequently, the level of social inequality 
will continue to remain a contentious issue because the advantaged group will 
continue to manipulate power and resources to their advantage. Those in rural 
areas will continue to remain under developed while the political elite 
continues to exploit the wealth of the nations. This was the very reason for the 
militant uprising, which sparked the conflict. 
87 John Roughan "Blame the Victim!" 
<http://www.sibconline.com.sb/Ana1ysis%20archive.asp> (Last accessed gm June 2002). 
88 John Roughan " It's not Money but Trust" 
<http://www.sibconline.com.sb/ Analysis%20archive.asp> (Last accessed I 01" September 
2002). 
89 Satish Chand "Conflict to crisis in Solomon Islands" ( I May 2002) 17 Pacific Economic 
Bulletin 155. 
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VI QUEST FOR COFLICT SOLUTIONS (1999- 2002) 
A Melanesian Way 
When the conflict started towards the end of 1998 as a result of 
violence action taken by Guadalcanal militants the government considered the 
'Melanesian Way' to resolve the conflict. This was the local way of settling 
disputes whereby a meeting would be called and traditional leaders would 
mediate. An open discussion would be used to determine the claims of 
aggrieved parties followed by a compromised solution and payment of 
compensation. The custom of compensation is a method of reconciliation that 
concerns two persons or parties. It involves exchange of food and other 
traditional valuables, such as shell money, for the restoration of peace and 
harmony whenever a wrong has been committed. Such an exchange would 
demonstrate genuine contrition rather than buying someone out of trouble.90 
This was the approach that the Ulufa' alu government favoured in 
resolving the conflict when it initially started. The government facilitated a 
meeting referred to as the Honiara Cultural Centre Meeting 23 May 1999 and 
the 1999 Marau Communique' 1999.9 1 This was the first attempt by the State 
in trying to restore peace and harmony and it involved the exchange of 
traditional valuables of shell money, pigs, yams and many other items. 
However, the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army now referred to as the Isatabu 
Freedom Movement breached the 'Melanesia Way' of dispute resolution by 
looting, driving out the inhabitants and burning Malaitan villages.92 In doing 
this the militants did not respect the traditional means of dispute resolution. 
90 Regina v Asuana [ 1990] SLLR 20 I, 202 Ward CJ (HC). 
91 John Roughan "Typed as I listened to SIBC" (7 July 2000) 
<http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanes ia/so lomonsarticles.htm# I> (Last accessed 20'11 June 2002). 
92 Roughan, above. 
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It transpired that the reconciliation gestures did not address the 
underlying causes of the conflict. There was serious doubt about the good 
faith of both the Isatabu Freedom Movement and the Malaita Eagle Force 
because there was a significant lack of correct, accurate and reliable 
information about the two groups.93 The breach of the 'Melanesian Way' of 
resolving the conflict during the early stages might be due to the lack of 
understanding why the militant groups were formed. Had there been an 
understanding of why the militant groups were a peaceful resolution would 
have been reached in order to maintain a stable society. 
Such interpretation of why the 'Melanesian Way' of dispute resolution 
failed can be explained by the use of the Human Needs Theory. This theory is 
based on the hypothesis that humans have basic needs that have to be met in 
order to maintain stable societies. John Burton summarised this as: 
We believe that the human participants in conflict situations 
are compulsively struggling in their respective institutional 
environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and 
universal needs - needs such as security, identity, 
recognition, and development. They strive increasingly to 
gain control of their environment that is necessary to ensure 
the satisfaction of these. This struggle cannot be curbed; it is 
primordial.94 
From the Human Needs Theory it could be claimed that had the 
'Melanesian Way' of dispute resolution taken into account what was the 
needs of the militants a peaceful resolution would have been reached during 
the early stages of the conflict. The Human Needs Theory is related to the 
Frustration - Aggression Theory, which is based on the premise that 
frustration of not satisfying needs leads to aggression and later conflict. 
93 John Roughan " December's Up Coming Election" (27'" Oct. 200 I) 
<http: //rspas.anu.edu .au/melanesia/solomonsarticles .htm# I> (Last accessed 2011' June 2002). 
94 John Burton "Conflict Resolution as a Political System" in Vamik Volkan and others (eds.) 
The Psychodynamics of international Relationships: Volume IJ: Unofficial Diplomacy at 
Work. (Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1991) 82/3 as cited in William G. Cunningham Jr. 
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However, the Human Needs Theory not only concerns absolute 
requirements or needs but also wants and desires. As explained by Burton: 
Now we know that there are fundamental universal values or 
human needs that must be met if societies are to be stable. 
That this is so thereby provides a non ideological basis for the 
establishment of institutions and policies. Unless identity 
needs are met in multi-ethnic societies, unless in every social 
system there is distributive justice, as sense of control, and 
prospects for the pursuit of all other human societal 
development needs, instability and conflict are inevitable.95 
Significantly, the Human Needs Theory recogmses and legitimises 
the underlying needs that forms the basis of influence for the creation of 
militant groups such as the Isatabu Freedom Movement and the Malaita 
Eagle Force. An understanding by the government of the needs that these two 
militant groups fought for would have created a sense of respect for the 
'Melanesian Way' of dispute resolution. The conflict in the Solomon Islands 
is much more complex than just the payment of compensation and exchange 
of gifts. Therefore, the 'Melanesian Way' should not be taken for granted just 
because it is the customary way of conflict resolution. 
B Rule of law 
The rule of law provides the boundaries regarding how the State and 
citizens should relate with one another in addressing issues. During the last 
two years the conflict in the Solomon Islands has put the rule of law to a test. 
Aggrieved parties in the conflict pressurised the government to pay 
compensation. Many argued that peace could be achieved if compensation is 
paid. As a result, after the coup on 5 June 2000 the newly elected Sogavare 
Conflict Theo,y and the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict/cunningham.htm> (Last accessed 18th September 2002). 
95 Burton, above, 21 as cited in Cunningham Jr, above. 
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government that replaced the old Prime Minister embarked on a series of 
compensation pay outs as a means to resolving the conflict. 
The Premier of Malaita, Mr. David Oeta received SBD$5 million 
compensation from the Guadalcanal Province for the slurs levelled at the 
province during the Cultural Centre peace talks in 23 May 1999. 96 The 
Premier of Malaita Province also received a cheque of SBD$1.8 million from 
the national government for missing Malaitans, claimed to be killed, during 
the conflict.97 The Guadalcanal Province received SBD$13 million from the 
national government for claims made by the province. These compensation 
payments were an attempt to clear the way for peace talks and calm down 
people's emotions. This was a normal procedure in Melanesian culture. 
However, the adopting of 'Melanesian Way' in an attempt to wm 
peace made the government look like an insurance company. Here the 
government was perceived as taking up the role of a traditional leader and 
acting like the peace - maker by using money as the bait for ensuring that 
aggrieved parties stop fight and let peace prevail. Ironically, such action by 
the State opened the compensation floodgates because citizens gradually 
developed the attitude of demanding the State for any wrongs committed by 
other citizens. The table below gives an illustration of such trend: 
Some Compensation Figures98 
Name Amount Pay detail DI Payment 
Paid 
Property claims 
F. Diau $190, 000 Chq. No. Mar.01 Committee, 
42192/42550 MNURP 
L. Mamuligeli $150, 000 Chq. No. 41886 Mar. 01 Committee, 
MNURP 
D. Dausabea $120, 000 Chq . No. 40281 Feb.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
F. Orodani $50, OOO Chq. No. 39668 Jan . 01 Committee, 
96 John Roughan "Typed as I listened to SlBC" (7 July 2000) 
<http: //rspas.anu.edu .au/melanesia/solomonsarticles.htm# I> (Last accessed 201" June 2002). 
97 Roughan , above. 
98 The figures reveal I 0% of the report received. 
MNURP 
J. Daurara $31,800 Chg. No. 41155 Feb.OJ Committee. 
MNURP 
Injury claims 
R. Marahare $150,000 Chg. No. 39706 Jan.01 Committee, 
MNURP 
B.G. $130, OOO Chg. No. 41938 Mar.01 Committee, 
Saenamua MNURP 
Morris Joe $50,000 Chg. No. 40265 Jan.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
Paul Kukiti $20, 000 Chg. No. 41789 Mar.01 Committee, 
MNURP 
David Rosal io $10,000 Chg. No. 41874 Mar.01 Committee, 
MNURP 
Eric Vagorau $3,000 Chg. No. 42672 May.01 Committee, 
MNURP 
Danf;!er claims 
Hon.M. Garo $43 , 200 Chg. No. 42466 May.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
Hon. D. Oeta $50,000 Chg. No. 39670 Jan .OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
Maia. $231 , OOO Chg. No. 3899 l Jan.OJ Committee, 
Assembly MNURP 
Vehicle claims 
L. Holosivi $120, 000 Chg. No. 41799 Mar.01 Committee, 
MNURP 
F. Maesala $75,000 Chg. No . 40262 Jan .01 Committee, 
MNURP 
M. Peter $70, 000 Chg. No . 40250 Jan .OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
J. Wale $50,000 Chg. No. 39654 Jan.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
A. Teho $41 , 600 Chg. No. Mar.OJ Committee, 
41832/4244 7 MNURP 
Professional claims 
Bridge $515, 720 Chg. No. 38194 x 3/ Sep/Nov Committee, 
Lawyers 37711 .00 MNURP 
Attorney- $200, OOO voucherno.275974 Feb.01 Committee, 
General MNURP 
Crystol $140, 000 Chg . No. Nov/Dec Committee, 
Lawyers 39298/37505 .00 MNURP 
J. Tebolo $J25, 000 Chg. No. J/Feb.01 Committee, 
407550/39669 MNURP 
Solicitor- $100, 000 voucherno.275975 Jan.OJ Committee, 
General MNURP 
Boat claims for MEF use 
Maofafia Ship $126, 2500 Chg . No. 40249 Jan .OJ Committee, 
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Co. MNURP 
Olifasia Ship $65,000 Chq. No. Jan.OJ Committee, 
Co. 39929/39961 MNURP 
Redly Gilbert $50,000 Chq. No. 39931 Jan.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
Reimbursement/Rev. loss/ business loss claims 
Hon. A $79,000 Chq. No. 38625 Dec.00 Committee, 
Kemakeza MNURP 
Adea John $48,000 Chq. No. 40279 Mar.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
P. Universal $20, 000 Chq. No. 42692 Mar.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
Theft and damage claims 
M.M $133,850 Chq. No. Jan/Apr. Committee, 
Construction 42081 /39660 01 MNURP 
K. $4,300 Chq. No.41830 Mar.OJ Committee, 
Construction MNURP 
Harassment claims 
J. Maesala $71,000 Chq. No. 41897 Mar.Ol Committee, 
MNURP 
F. N.& Family $20,000 Chq. No. 42525 May.OJ Committee, 
MNURP 
R. Baokosu $2,000 Chq. No.42696 Mar.OJ. Committee, 
MNURP 
Source: (Ministry ofNational Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, 2001). 
From the table it is apparent that there is inconsistency in terms of 
how the compensation is paid out. Most of the claims are related to areas of 
law such as the Commission oflnquiry Act,99 Death and Fire Inquiries Act 100 
or the Workman's Compensation Act. 101 Claims for things such as injuries, 
harassment, and damage to property or loss of earnings are common law 
claims. 102 Therefore, the courts had the jurisdiction to deal with these claims. 
Ironically, it was the State that paid compensation. This raises the question of 
whether the dollar did buy justice. 
The figures showed that the dollar was not the means to achieve 
justice. All the claims were lodged outside the expected legal process that 
99 Cap 5. 
ioo Cap 9. 
101 Cap 77. 
102 See Jennifer.Corrin Care " Rationality or Intuition? The assessment of the quantum of 
damages for personal injuries in Solomon Islands" (1996) 2 NZACL Yearbook 237 - 258. 
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was supposed to be followed. The State used an unconventional approach in 
dealing with people's demands during the tension. Consequently, extortion 
was inevitable and a few became overwhelmingly enriched at the expense of 
the depressing economy. Millions of dollars have been paid out as 
compensation money but it was evident that the underlying causes to the 
conflict remained unsettled. 
C Peace Agreements 
There were many peace accords signed from when the conflict started 
to the cease-fire stages. The peace accords and other signings were as 
follows: (1) Honiara Cultural Centre Meeting 23 May 1999, Marau 
Communique 1999; (2) Honiara Peace Accord 18 June 1999; (3) Panatina 
Agreement 12 August 1999; (4) Aruligo Resolution 5 December 1999; (5) 
Buala Peace Conference 5 May 2000; (6) Auki Commitment to Peace 12 
May 2000, Pre-cease-fire Guidelines 22 May 2000; (7) Tobruk Peace 
Signing 7 July 2000, Conditions for Cease-fire 3 June 2000; and (8) 
Townsville Peace Agreement 15 October 2000. It was after seven peace 
accords and signings that the militants managed to come to reach final peace 
agreement. 
The number of peace accords and s1gnmgs revealed that the 
government's repeated peace attempts. They were not successful because of 
several factors. First, there was no common ground for both militant groups 
to negotiate. Secondly, both militant groups had serious suspiciousness about 
each other and there was considerable doubt whether the signing of the 
accords was done in good faith. Thirdly, the breach of the peace accords 
might be because there was uncertainty by both militant groups regarding 
how genuine were the peace accords. While there might be peaceful gestures 
exchanged in the signing of the peace accords it was apparent that these 
gestures did not address the underlying causes of the conflict. 
The peace accords and signings seem to indicate that the State was 
trying to facilitate managing and then settling the conflict. This appeared to 
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be the case because initially the State paid compensation to the aggrieved 
parties as a way for calming the tension and then asked the warring parties to 
negotiate a peace deal. According to John Burton there is a distinction 
between conflict resolution, management and settlement. He defined conflict 
management as an alternative dispute resolution skill and can confine or limit 
conflict while settlement is by authoritative and legal processes and can be 
imposed by elites. 103 
The peace accords and signings seemed to be what Burton 
categorised as conflict management and settlement. These were not same as 
conflict resolution, which Burton explained as: 
... conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods 
that are analytical and that get to the root of the problem. 
Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or 
'settlement', points to an outcome that, in the view of the 
parties involved, is a permanent solution. 104 
Based on Burton's explanation it seemed that the breaching of the peace 
accords and signings by the militants was because there was no analytical 
method that got to the root of the problem. In addition, the peace accords and 
signings might be perceived as not pointing to an outcome and that the 
suggested solutions might not be permanent. 
The cessation of fighting between the Isatabu Freedom Movement 
and Malaita Eagle Force happened after the signing of the Townsville Peace 
Agreement, 15 October 2000. Australia and New Zealand facilitated the 
peace agreement between the militant groups and the government. Under the 
TP A there were clauses that stipulate development to take place on 
Guadalcanal and Malaita, disarmament and the government to find funds to 
meet the demands of aggrieve citizens who were affected by the conflict. 
103 John Burton " 'Conflict Resolution as a Political System" in Varnik Volkan and others 
(eds.) The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy 
at Work__(Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1991) 73 as cited in William G. Cunningham Jr. 
Conflict Theory and the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
<http: //cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict/cunningham.htm> (Last accessed I 81h September 2002). 
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Significantly, the TPA attempts to address the causes of the conflict but 
realistically that is not the case. 
The deadline for the surrender of arms was 301h November after the 
signing of the TP A. It was later postponed to 31 51 December 2000 and then 
again a later date in 2001. The final deadline was set at 31 st May 2002 but 
still militant groups showed very little commitment to the disarmament 
deadline despite the noble intention of the TPA that surrender of arms would 
give both militant groups the opportunity to rebuild trust and confident. The 
justification given by militants who did not want to surrender the arms was 
because of fear of future ethnically driven attacks. 
This has caused a continued security threat to the public because there 
are members of the militant groups that use arms to manipulate the payment 
of compensation payments as well as benefit from duty remissions. 
Significantly, the architects of the TPA did not anticipate that disarmament of 
militant would be difficult. 105 However, the Melanesian Brothers 106 effected 
a significant influence in the disarmament and peace process. They were able 
to mediate between the militant groups as co-equals and peers. Such sterling 
involvement deserves public acknowledge and gratitude. This indicated the 
beginning of a way forward. 
104 Burton, above, 72 as cited in Cunningham Jr, above. 
105 Neither did the TPA specify how the development project agreed upon during the signing 
would be funded. 
106 The Melanesian Brothers is a local religious group of the Anglican Church of Melanesia. 
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VII A WAY FORWARD 
A Restorative Justice 
Since the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement on 15 October 
2000 it was evident that Solomon Islands was still far from security, order 
and peace. Take for example, the brutal murder of a former Isatabu Freedom 
Movement Commander, Selywn Saki on 23rd September 2001 and the recent 
massacre of eleven gunmen from Malaita by the ex-militia and Commander 
of IFM, Harold Keke. 107 There are other incidents carried out by ex-militia 
after the signing of the TP A. In Honiara, Gangs of armed militia roam the 
streets in stolen vehicles and wait for someone to insult them, their family or 
friends so that they can retaliate and demand compensation. Extortion has 
become an epidemic after the signing of the TPA. 108 
Such trend reflects a lack of real conflict resolution that would cater 
for justice and true peace. John Burton in an attempt to define conflict 
resolution stated: 
Whatever the definition we have of conflict, wherever we 
draw the line, right down to family violence, we are referring 
to situations in which there is a breakdown in relationships 
and a challenge to norms to authorities ... [Conflict] is due to 
an assertion of individualism. It is a rrustration based protest 
against lack of opportunities for development and against 
lack of recognition and identity. Whether the tension , 
conflict, or violence has origins in class, status, ethnicity, 
sex, religion, or nationalism, we are dealing with the same 
fundament issues . 109 
107 Philip Vine "The Back of a Shark" (31 51 August 2002) listener New Zealand 26, 28. 
108 Vine, above. 
109 John Burton " Political Realities" in Vamik Volkan and others (eds.), The Psychodynamics 
of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work (Lexington, MA, 
Lexington Books, 1991) 20 as cited in William G. Cunningham Jr. Conflict Theo,y and the 
Conflict in Northern !re/and <http: //cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict/cunningham.htm> (Last accessed 
t 81" September 2002). 
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What is experienced in Solomon Islands after the TP A is the 
continued break down in relationships. If the ex-militants could begin to 
recognise that there is a break down in relationships and that fundamental 
similarities exist, then the process of abstraction will enhance their 
objectivity. Such process would enable the participants to come to the 
understanding that all the participants have legitimate needs that must be 
satisfied in order to resolve conflict. It is also vital to develop an analytical 
process to facilitate the changes required to create a political and social 
system in which these needs can be addressed. 110 
John Burton further developed that conflict resolution concerns a 
process of political change, social and economic systems. It is an analytical 
and problem solving process that takes into consideration such individual and 
group needs as identity and recognition. This also includes institutional 
changes that are required to satisfy these needs. 111 These approaches should 
be adopted in resolving the conflict in Solomon Islands because the 
underlying causes to the conflict are to do with development, identity and 
respect, loss of life and property. Both militant groups in the conflict in 
Solomon Islands have something tangible to bargain for therefore the 
application of Burton's conflict resolution theory is appropriate. 
It seems the way forward to resolve the conflict in Solomon Islands is 
through restorative justice. This involves a process of reconciliation that 
provides an avenue for rebuilding of relationships between those involved in 
the conflict, their families, their communities and the nation of Solomon 
Islands. The process of rebuilding of relationships must cater for those who 
did wrong to admit their faults and be held responsible. In addition, those 
who were made victims of such wrongs must be apologised to and given the 
chance to forgive and come to grips with their loss. The restoring of 
relationships through the process of reconciliation must take into 
11° Cunningham Jr, above. 
111 John Burton "Conflict Resolution as a Political System", above, 71 as cited in 
Cunningham Jr, above . 
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consideration every person at all levels of society. Only then can there be 
confidence and trust amongst citizens. 
B National Identity 
The fragmentation of Solomon Islands has created divisions and 
differences for decades. Solomon Mamaloni, the first Chief Minister of 
Solomon Islands realised such complexity when he mentioned: 
All these small " islands nations" were independent entities 
long before the northern explorers found them. Their cultures 
differed from each other. 
While such diversity may be a source of conflict achieving national unity is 
impo1iant for policy formulation reasons, national wealth in general and 
development. 112 
Therefore, there is a need to develop a national identity. This does not 
mean that every Solomon Islander has to give up their identities within their 
own islands for the creation of a national identity. The encouraging of 
national identity should be seen within Solomon Islands ' diversity. The 
diversity of Solomon Islands is not a source of conflict. It is the disrespect for 
these identities within diversity that has caused problems. The national 
identity should be found within the respect for the different identities. 11 3 
The militant appraisal towards the end of 1998 by disgruntled 
Guadalcanal men was a result many settlers not respecting the customs of 
Guadalcanal people in relation to land occupation and use. There was an 
increase in squatter settlements and farming on Guadalcanal by settlers that 
had no intention to pay rent or compensation. Hence, resentment and 
11 2 Gordon Nanau " Uniting The Fragments: Solomon Islands constitutional reforms" (2000 
Development Research Symposium: South Pacific Futures (FDC) Conference, Brisbane, 22-
24July 2002) 6. 
11 3 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka "The Guadalcanal Issue: A Frank Talk Part I[ ( 1999) 
<http: //www.geocities.com/ jannicolass/23b0699.html> (Last accessed I 01h June 2002). 
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grievance was developed resulting m conflict. Such conflict could be 
described as: 
These identity groups, whether formed around shared religious, 
ethnic, racial , cultural , or other characteristics, will act to 
achieve and insure their distinctive identity within society. 
When they are denied physical and economic security, political 
participation, and recognition from other groups, their 
distinctive identity is lost, and they will do whatever is in their 
power to regain it. 114 
Therefore, while the Enemy System and Human eeds Theories may 
provide an explanation of conflict and using the John Burton's Conflict 
Resolution Theory to map the way forward, track two diplomacy should be 
considered because the conflict in the Solomon Islands also has an identity 
dimension. Track Two Diplomacy is considered as: 
... an unofficial , informal interaction between members of 
adversary groups or nations that aims to deve lop strategies, 
influence public opinion, and organise human and material 
resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. It 
must be understood that track two diplomacy is in no way a 
substitute for official, formal, "track one" government to 
government or leader to leader relationships. 11 5 
The issue of national identity in the Solomon Islands is lacking 
because there is less respect for the diverse of peoples. Diversity is a source 
of strength for unity because within that diversity Solomon Islanders can 
114 Edward E. Azar, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict" in Vam ik 
Volkan and other, above, 95 as cited in William G. Cunningham Jr. , above. 
115Joseph V. Montville "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two 
Diplomacy" in Vamik Volkan, and others (eds.), The Psychodynamics of ir1ternational 
Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work (Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 
1991) 162 as cited in William G. Cunningham Jr. Conflict Theory and the Conflict in 
Northern Ireland <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/co ntlict/cunningham.htm> (Last accessed I 81" 
September 2002). 
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find, establish and express the essence of being a Solomon Islander". 116 
There are two different militants Since the conflict in the Solomon Islands 
involves two militant groups from Malaita and Guadalcanal, track two 
diplomacy could be considered. 
C A Model/or Government during Conflict 
Government in Solomon Islands is based on the Westminster system 
of democracy. Since the beginning of the conflict, the government has been 
unsuccessful in addressing the issues surrounding the conflict. The 
government's ineffectiveness in addressing social and economic instability 
and the law and order problem has weakened the State. This worsening 
situation has allowed the media to describe Solomon Islands as a "failed 
state". However, close to the truth this may appear to these observers, the 
description can be interpreted as an insult to the Head of State, Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth II. 
When faced with conflict as at W. W .II, the Queen's father King 
George VI was advised by his Ministers to declare a state of crisis for Great 
Britain and the Dominions of the British Empire and created governments of 
national unity. No loyal opposition was permitted because the main concern 
at that time was national defence and survival. Significantly, this could be a 
precedent model for government in Solomon Islands during the present 
conflict period. There are basic issues such as "peace, progress and 
prosperity", social and economic development, the restoration of transport 
and general infrastructure that must be considered. There is no time to be 
opposing one another over details when basic issues of security and survival 
are at stake. 
Hence, it seems to be appropriate for the representatives of the Head 
of State's, the Governors General of Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea 
and New Zealand, to meet and advise the Queen to acknowledge that 
116 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka "The Guadalcanal Issue: A Frank Talk Part II ( 1999) 
<http://www.geocities.com/ jannicolass/23b0699.html> (Last accessed I O'" June 2002). 
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Solomon Islands is a nation in conflict. They should propose a temporary 
government of national unity. The Governor General of Solomon Islands 
representing the Head of State would call parliamentarians to get and select a 
cabinet. Government decisions would be based on consensus until the 
conflict is resolved. Such a model for government blends in well with the 
traditional Melanesian system of good governance. Instead of being seen in 
the eyes of the world as a weak and failing State, Solomon Islands could be 
seen as a nation prepared to resolve its crisis. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
The conflict in Solomon Islands has created socio-economic and 
political instability. The causes of the conflict are embedded in its history. 
They evolved around issues such as land, development, identity and politics. 
The relationship between citizens, primarily those from Guadalcanal and 
Malaita was broken because of the disagreements over resource allocations, 
roles, rights and identity. According to Burton, these are basic needs that can 
not be traded off against one another, but have to be respected in any 
negotiation process. 11 7 
The underlying causes of the conflict in Solomon Islands should be 
addressed using Burton' s theory of conflict resolution. This is because the 
theory provides a framework for problem solving rather than problem 
preventing. Conflict resolution is a method that addresses the problem and 
defines it. Such resolution is suitable for resolving the conflict in Solomon 
Islands because it is a decision making process that avoids relying on power 
or enforcement by getting to the source of the problem and resolving it to the 
satisfaction of the parties concerned. 11 8 
Many lives have been lost; many people displaced and many 
properties damaged during the conflict years. Despite the signing of The 
Townsville Peace Agreement in October 2000, there exists an open wound of 
hatred and distrust amongst citizens that may take many years to heal. 
Therefore, a way forward for Solomon Islands is to encourage restorative 
justice so that its citizens are able to rebuild trust and confidence in one 
another again. This calls for respect of peoples ' identity and the promotion of 
good government that serves in order to lead Solomon Islanders from conflict 
to contentment. 
Then, the islands will once again be "Happy Isles", and its people will 
sing the National Anthem' s prayer for "joy, peace, progress and prosp erity; 
that men should brothers be; let nations see, our Solomon Islands". 
11 7 John W. Burton "Conflict Resolution: Towards Problem Solving" 
<www.colorado.edu/contlict/transfonn/bu1ton.htnl°> (Last accessed l 011, Sept. ::?.002). 
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